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As indicative of a general characteristic of all phenomena, the
term dukkha should not be understood in a narrower sense to mean
only pain, suffering, misery or sorrow. As a philosophical terms
it has a wider connotation, as wide as that of the term anicca.
In this wider sense, it includes deeper ideas such as imperfection,
unrest, conflict, in short unsatisfactoriness. This is precisely
why even the states of jhana, resulting from the practice of higher
meditation and which are free from suffering as ordinarily understood,
are also included in dukkha. This is also why the characterization,
dukkha is extended even to matter (rupa). The Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa
recognizes these wider implications of the term when it explains
it as three fold, namely dukkha (dukkha as suffering), vi pari nama-dukkha
(dukkha as change) and sankharadukkha (dukkha as conditioned state).As
a direct and necessary corollary of this fact of dukkha, we come
to the third basic characteristic of all phenomena, namely anatta,
which finds expression in the well known statement: Sabbe dhamma
anatta. For the unsatisfactory nature of everything should lead
to this important conclusion: If everything is characterized by
unsatisfactoriness, nothing can be identified as the self or as
a permanent soul (atta). What is dukkha (by that very fact) is also
anatta. What is not the self cannot be considered as I am (ahan
ti) as mine (maman ti), or as I am that (asmi ti).
THE SOUL THEORY
According to Buddhism the idea of self or soul is not only a false
and imaginary belief, with no corresponding objective reality, but
is also harmful from an ethical point of view. For it produces such
harmful thoughts of I, me and mine. Selfish desires, attachments
and all other unwholesome states of mind (akusala dhamma). It could
also be a misery in disguise to one who accepts it as true: Do you
see, 0 Bhikkhus, such a soul-theory in the acceptance of which there
would not arise grief, lamentation, suffering, distress and tribulation?
Certainly not Sir," "Good, 0 Bhikkhus, I too 0 Bhikkhus,
do not see a soul-theory, in acceptance of which there would not
arise grief, lamentation, suffering, distress and tribulation"
(I. 137 MAJJIMA NIKAYE). This brings into relief the close connection
between the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence and Buddhist ethics:
If the world of experience is impermanent, by that very fact it
cannot be made the basis of permanent happiness. What is not permanent
(annicca) and therefore what is characterized by unsatisfactoriness
(dukkha) cannot be considered as the self (annatta). And what is
not the self (atta) cannot be considered as one's own (saka) or
as a haven of security (tana). For the things that one gets attached
to are constantly changing. Hence attachment to them would only
lead to unrest and sorrow. But when one knows things as they truly
are (yathabutam) i.e., annicca, dukkha, and anatta, one ceased to
get agitated by them, one ceases to take refuge in them. Just as
attachment to things is to get fettered by them, even so detachment
from them is to get freed from them. Thus in the context of Buddhist
ethics, the perception of impermanence is only a preliminary step
to the eradication of all cravings, which in turn has the attainment
of Nibbana as its final goal.
It will thus be seen that the Buddhist doctrine of annicca, on
which is also based the doctrine of dukkha and anatta, can rightly
be called the very foundation of the whole edifice of Buddhist philosophy
and ethics. This explains why the Buddha has declared that the very
perception of this fact, namely that whatever comes to existence
is also subject to dissolution (yam kinci samudayadhammam sabbam
tamnirodh- dhammam) is indeed the very arising of the stainless
Eye of the Doctrine (dhamnmacakku).
THE THEORY OF MOMENTARINESS
The Buddhist doctrine of impermanence, as explained in the canonical
texts, does really amount to a theory of momentariness, in the sense
that everything is in a state of constant flux. This becomes clear
from a passage in the Anguttaranikaya (I 152), where the three sankhata-Iakkhamas
(the characteristic of that which is compounded are explained. Here
it is said that which is Sankhata (compound) has three fundamental
characteristics, namely uppada (origination), vaya (dissolution),
and thitassa annathatta (otherwise of that which is existing). From
this it followsthat the Buddhist doctrine of change should not be
understood in the ordinary sense that something arises, exists for
some time in a more or less static form, and dissolves.
On the contrary,
the third characteristic, i.e. thitassa annathatta shows that between
its arising and cessation, a thing is all the time changing, with
no static phase in between. Thus the Buddhist doctrine of change
does really amount to a theory of universal flux.As far as the application
of this theory of change is concerned, there is nothing to suggest
that early Buddhism had made any distinction between mind and matter.
However, some schools of Buddhism, notably the Mahasanghikas, Vatsiputriyas
and Sammityas, while recognizing the momentary duration of mental
elements, assigned a relative permanence to matter. Others such
as Sarvastivadins, Mahasasakas and Sautranitkas objected to introducing
any such distinction and declared that all elements of existence,
mental as well as material, are of momentary duration of instantaneous
being. (Article abridged)Introducing the writer: Prof. Y. Karunadasa
Ph.D. is the Director of Buddhist Studies, Buddhist and Pali University
Colombo. He is a well known academic and Pali Scholar. |
